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Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the
World Trade Organization: The Inability of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to
Achieve Compliance from Superpower
Nations

Benjamin L. Brimeyer
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
changed the face of international dispute settlement by creating
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 1 The WTO was designed
to take the place of the flawed General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) regime. 2 In so doing, the WTO created a more
rule-based dispute resolution process. This new process seeks to
eliminate much of the delay and subsequent lack of compliance
3
associated with the GATT dispute settlement mechanism.
In the years since the creation of the WTO, several disputes
have traversed its dispute resolution process. Each dispute has
shed light on the operation of the WTO, revealed its
shortcomings, and ultimately led to many scholarly debates. The
United States and the European Union currently stand
deadlocked in two separate disputes that have run the course of
the WTO dispute resolution process. First, in a dispute
regarding the European Banana Import regime, the WTO found
the EU regime discriminatory. 4 Because the European Union
failed to bring its regime into compliance with the ruling, the
United States has been forced to impose sanctions. Similarly, in
a dispute regarding the European Union's ban on hormone

1. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 2 (1999).
2. See id.
3. See Azar M. Khansari, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International
Dispute Resolution and the New World Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 183, 189 (1996).
4. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
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treated beef, the WTO found the ban invalid.' Again the
European Union failed to lift its ban and the United States was
forced to impose sanctions. While these disputes raise many
questions about the dispute resolution process generally, the
non-compliance of the losing party in each instance may
seriously undermine the effectiveness of the WTO's dispute
resolution process.
This Note will show the ineffective nature of the dispute
resolution process under the WTO and its apparent inability to
achieve compliance from superpower nations in light of the
recent disputes regarding bananas and beef hormones. Part I
describes the history of international dispute resolution by
looking at the GATT system, its evolution into the current WTO,
and dispute settlement under the WTO. Part II discusses in
detail and analyzes the current disputes between the United
States and the European Union regarding bananas, and beef
hormones. Part III looks into some of the other factors that go
into compliance with WTO rulings. Although the WTO is still
new to international dispute resolution and much will change in
the coming years, the disputes regarding beef hormones and
bananas demonstrate some of the shortcomings of the WTO. The
shortcomings demonstrated by the beef and banana disputes
will ultimately point to the WTO Dispute Settlement Process as
an ineffective mechanism to achieve compliance from
superpower nations.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE WTO

In order to best analyze the ability of the WTO to effectively
achieve compliance from superpower nations, one must first
understand the origins of the system under the GATT, the
evolution into its current state, and the workings of its dispute
settlement mechanism.
A.

IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS THE

GATT

Following World War II, several nations entered into a
trade agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs
7
and Trade 6 intending to liberalize trade and reduce tariffs.
5.

See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.

6.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,

T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT Agreement].
7. See William E. Scanlan, A Test Case for the New

World Trade
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These nations, known collectively as the contracting parties,"
did not intend the GATT to be an actual organization, 9 but
merely a temporary agreement. 10 Indeed, while creating the
GATT the contracting parties simultaneously worked on the
creation of the International Trade Organization (ITO)" to
absorb the GATT. 12 The ITO never came into existence,
however, because the United States Congress refused to ratify
it.' 3 The collapse of the ITO left the GATT, an organization
without the constitutional and institutional foundation
necessary to function,1 4 as the international community's focus
for cooperation on trade matters." As a result, the GATT
remained ill equipped to handle the broad task of regulating
world trade relations 6 and found itself in a state of "constant
improvisation." 7 Many of the shortcomings, flaws, and
weaknesses of the GATT can be attributed to its inauspicious
8
inception as an international trade organization.'
1.

The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism

The GATT contracting parties utilized the provisions of
Articles XXII and XXIII19 to serve as the basis for the dispute
21
settlement procedure. 20 Under this procedure, legal disputes

Organization's Dispute Settlement Understanding: The Japan-United States Auto
PartsDispute, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996).
8. See id. at 594.
9. See The World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty Hearings Before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 994 WL 266992 (F.D.H.C) June 4,
1994 [hereinafter Jackson Testimony] (testimony of Professor John H. Jackson).
10. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 4.
11. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
12. See Hudec, supra note 1.
13. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
14. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 50-51 (1969).
15. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
16. See Khansari, supra note 3, at 189.
17. Scanlan, supra note 7, at 594.
18. See Miquel Montana i Mora, A GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in
the Resolution of InternationalTrade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 108
(1993).
19. See GATT Agreement, supra note 6, arts. XXII and XXIII.
20. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 4-5.
21. The GATT Agreement specifically refers to disputes regarding "customs
regulations and formalities, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, quantitative
and exchange regulations, subsidies, state-trading operations, sanitary laws and
regulations for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, and generally
all matters affecting the operation of this Agreement." GATT Agreement, supra note
6, art. XXII.
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between contracting parties first went through consultation and
negotiation. 22 In the event that the parties failed to reach a
solution, the dispute would "be submitted to panels of three to
seven GATT delegates from neutral countries who would issue
legal rulings on the merits of the complaint." 23 The panel would
take evidence, hear arguments, and submit a written decision to
the GATT council. 24 Once the council received the written
decision of the panel, it could adopt the panel's decision only by25
a unanimous vote of all the GATT Council Contracting Parties. 26
In extreme instances contracting parties, acting collectively,
could authorize a contracting party to suspend the application to
any other contracting party of obligations or concessions under
the Agreement as they determined to be appropriate under the
27
circumstances.
Despite its "inauspicious beginning" and ill-defined dispute
settlement system, the GATT enjoyed success for much of its
history,28 especially during its first decade of use. 29 According to
a leading GATT scholar:
Governments understood the legal rulings implicit in its vaguely
worded decisions, and once these rulings were approved by the GATT
Contracting Parties, defendant governments almost always felt it
necessary to comply. The reason these impressionistic half-decisions
were successful was that the early GATT of the 1950s was essentially
a small "club" of likeminded trade policy officials who had been
working together since the 1946-1948 ITO negotiations... Thus they
did not need a very elaborate decision-making procedure to generate
about what particular governments were
an effective consensus
30
expected to do.

Eventually the rather homogeneous group of contracting

22.

See id.

23. Hudec, supra note 1, at 5. Note, however, that the GATT does not
specifically provide for the panel process. See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMAcY 74-75 (1975).

24.

See Khansari, supra note 3, at 185 (citing generally Rosine Plank, An

Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not, J. INT'L ARB.,

December 1987, at 53).
25. See id. (citing Plank, supra note 24, at 88).
26. See GATT Agreement, supra note 6, art. XXV para. 1.
27. See id. art. XXIII para. 2. In such a situation the contracting party against
which sanctions have been levied may submit to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations its intention to withdraw from the GATT Agreement, which would become
effective sixty days later. See id.
28.

Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.

29. See Scanlan, supra note 7, at 595.
30. Hudec, supra note 1, at 5-6.

20011

BANANAS, BEEF AND

WTO

COMPLIANCE

parties gave way to a larger, more diverse group of nations. 31
While the GATT had developed its dispute settlement
mechanism into a powerful legal instrument by the end of the
1980s, it was confronted with an ever-increasing degree of
difficulty in settling disputes and political criticism. 32 "The
GATT system was being increasingly challenged by the
33
changing conditions of international economic activity,"
resulting in an increased number of disputes that the system
could not successfully resolve. 34 These continued difficulties and
failures of the GATT dispute settlement system revealed its
35
procedural weaknesses and caused great concern.
2. Problems with the GATT Dispute Settlement Process and
Movement Towards the WTO
As explained, the most glaring problems with the GATT
dispute settlement system stemmed from its troublesome
inception. 36 Because the contracting parties never intended the
GATT to be an international trade organization, its formal
structure remained flimsy and it often operated with procedural
weakness.37 Thus, many of these "birth defects" contributed to
the ongoing struggles and failures of the GATT dispute
38
resolution process.
31. See id. at 6. Professor Hudec also points out that many political leaders
began to pay greater attention to the GATT. See id. at 7. Some would
simultaneously question its assertion of legal authority over their trade policies,
while also demanding more aggressive prosecution of GATT legal claims. See id.
Often times this lead to poor decisions revealing the inadequacy of the diplomatic
approach taken by the GATT system. See id. Eventually, however, greater resources
were delegated to the panel procedure allowing it to render more sophisticated
decisions. See id. at 8.
32. See id.
33. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
34. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 8. Professor Hudec argues, however, that
despite the increased number of failures, the GATT was a remarkably successful
international legal institution. See id. By the end of the 1980s "over 80% of the cases
were still being successfully disposed of." Id. Similarly, the participating
governments viewed the GATT system as successful. See id.
35. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 9; Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
Specifically, Jackson states that "[c]oncern developed that the GATT was too
handicapped to play the needed role of complementing the Bretton Woods system as
the 'third leg', along side the IMF and the World Bank." Id.
36. See id. (stating that the GATT struggled to fill the gap left by the ITO
failure and labeling its many problems as "birth defects").
37. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 9.
38. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9. In addition to defects in the dispute
settlement process, Jackson also refers to problems in
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One of the most troublesome aspects of the GATT dispute
resolution process stemmed from the voluntary nature of the
procedure. 39 Every decision made by the organization required
complete consensus. 40 "This meant that the defendant had a
virtual right to veto every step of the process, from the
appointment of a panel to the adoption of the panel's legal
ruling and the authorization of trade sanctions for
noncompliance." 41 The ability of the defendant country to block
adverse decisions decreased confidence in the GATT's ability
to
42
provide justice in international trade dispute resolution.
As confidence in the GATT dispute resolution process
decreased, the GATT's role in the international community
diminished. 43 Similarly, other procedural flaws in the GATT
system left many contracting parties frustrated, and there arose
a growing lack of coordination and discussion among officials of
national governments. 44 These procedural problems also
involved too many competing codes and dispute settlement
arrangements, which undermined the coherence and respect for
the GATT system.45 Other procedural problems included forum
shopping in order to get a desired result, delays in the
organization and working of panel proceedings, and a concern

Provisional application and Grandfather rights exceptions, Ambiguity
about the powers of the Contracting Parties to make certain decisions,
Ambiguity regarding the waiver authority and risks of misuse, Murky legal
status leading to misunderstanding by the public, media, and even
government officials, certain defects in the dispute settlement procedure,
and Lack of institutional provisions generally, so constant improvisation
was necessary.

Id.
39. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 9.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See Khansari, supra note 3, at 185.
43. See id.
44. See id. (quoting John H. Jackson, Managing the Trading System: The
World Trade Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda, in
MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY FIFTY YEARS AFrER BRETTON WOODS 131, 142
(Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994)).
45. See Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism,4
J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 3, 7 (1995). Stiles cites to John H. Jackson's prediction that "the
interrelationships between the various Codes and the GATT will become
increasingly complex." Id. (citing J. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 25
(1990)). Such complexities will make it harder for the general public to understand
the GATT system resulting in less public support for the system. See id. The
complexities will also give rise to a variety of legal disputes among contracting
parties and "will contribute to the belief that the richer nations can control and can
manipulate the GATT system for their own advantage." Id.
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regarding the quality of the panelists themselves. 46 Once a
decision had been rendered, its vague wording often resulted in
difficulties determining the panel's reasoning. 47 Similarly,
because documents related to the decision-making process were
unavailable, future claimants lacked notice of what to expect
from the dispute resolution process.48 This montage of
procedural problems ultimately resulted in a dispute settlement
49
mechanism lacking a worthwhile body of case law.

While the procedural problems with the GATT system
clearly undermined its development,5 0 some contend that the
failure of the system resulted from both a lack of consensus
regarding GATT norms5 1 and the lack of compliance with GATT
decisions. 52 The lack of consensus regarding the GATT norms
can be traced to the shift in the contracting parties from the
original homogenous "club" to a diverse and complex group of
nations with differing ideas regarding the dispute settlement
process. 53 These differing philosophies led to inconsistent GATT
panel decisions and "growing unwillingness among Contracting
Parties to comply with GATT decisions." 54 Indeed, by the midnineties, compliance with GATT panel decisions fell to under
sixty percent.5 5 Similarly, several of the cases brought to the
GATT dispute settlement mechanism were either abandoned or
withdrawn due to the parties' belief that the system was

46. See Stiles supra note 45, at 8. "Legal scholars generally deplored the lack of
legal experts on GATT panels." Id. Similarly, because so few panels convened, it was
often difficult to find experienced GATT panelists. See id.
47. See id. at 9.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Khansari, supra note 3, at 184-86. But see Hudec, supra note 1, at 9-10.
Professor Hudec argues that
up through 1990, the procedural weaknesses of the GATT procedure did
not really have all that much impact on its overall success. Although the
procedure was not compulsory, defendant governments almost always
decided to cooperate with it.... Although compliance was not always
forthcoming, the pressure to comply was almost always there once the
community arrived at a consensus that the ruling was correct.
Id.
51. See Mora, supra note 18, at 127.
52. See Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement
Reports: In The Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307, 319-20 (1996).
53. See Khansari, supra note 3, at 186-87.
54. See id. at 187. See also Stiles supra note 45, at 9-10.
55. See Stiles, supra note 45, at 9. Stiles states that during GATT's first twenty
years "implementation of GATT panel decisions hovered around eighty percent." Id.
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ineffective. 56 The lack of compliance and the growing belief that
the GATT was an ineffective dispute settlement mechanism
served to further undermine the authority of the GATT and
57
created a need for changes in the system.
The deterioration of the dispute settlement system under
the GATT meant that problems within the system needed to be
addressed. 58 The contracting parties would first have to "define
once and for all... the main function of the procedure in
general and the panels in particular." 9 They would also have to
resolve the particular procedural problems within the system
and come to some agreement as to the norms themselves. 60 The
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations addressed
these issues and brought into existence the WTO. 61
B.

A NEW SYSTEM: THE WTO
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
began in 1993 and concluded in December of 1996.62 The
contracting parties to the GATT intended that the negotiations
address many of the problems and shortcomings of the GATT
system, including the dispute settlement process. 63 During the
seven-year negotiations many important objectives were
accomplished, including the establishment of the charter for the
WTO.6 4
1.

WTO Basics and Differences from the GATT

The WTO fulfills many of the functions proposed in the
1940s for the failed ITO. Most importantly, it replaces the GATT
as the institution intended to be the authority on world trade

56. See Schaefer, supra note 54, at 320.
57. See Khansari, supra note 3, at 186.
58. See Scanlan, supra note 7, at 597.
59. See Mora, supra note 18, at 127.
60. See id.
61. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
62. See Scanlan, supra note 7, at 597.
63. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
64. See Scanlan, supra note 7, at 597 (citing Results of the Uruguay Round
Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. 198
(1994)). Many feel that the Uruguay Round "accomplished more than any of the
previous seven rounds of GATT-sponsored negotiations." Id. Some of the
accomplishments of the Uruguay Round include the lowering of tariffs and the
extension of protection to services and intellectual property. See id; see Jackson
Testimony, supra note 9.
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relations, negotiations, and dispute resolutions. 65 The WTO
implements the rules negotiated in the Uruguay Round and is
guided by GATT decisions, procedures, and practices. 66 The
WTO differs from the proposed ITO, however, in that "the WTO
charter itself is entirely institutional and procedural, but it
incorporates the substantive agreements resulting from the
Uruguay Round into annexes." 67 Because all member countries
must accept the entire package of substantive agreements in
order to join, the WTO can avoid a system in which countries
are free to "pick and choose which rules to follow and which to
68
ignore."
Generally, the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations intended that the WTO serve
five main functions: 69 (1) facilitate the implementation,
administration and operation, and further the objectives of the
agreement; 70 (2) provide a forum for negotiations among its
71
members concerning matters addressed under the agreement;
(3) administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes;7 2 (4) administer the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism; 73 and (5) cooperate with the
International Monetary Fund, International Bank, and related
agencies for reconstruction and development with a view
74
towards achieving greater coherence in global economic policy.

The general structure of the WTO contains three main
entities. 75 The Ministerial Conference consists of representatives
of all Contracting Parties, meets at least once every two years,

65. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art. II, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Act]; see also Khansari, supra note 3, at 188; see also Scanlan,
supra note 7, at 597-98.
66. See Khansari, supra note 3, at 188.
67. Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
68. Scanlan, supra note 7, at 598.
69. See Final Act, supra note 65, art. III, paras. 1-5.
70. See id. art. III, para. 1.
71. See id. art. III, para. 2.
72. See id. art. III, para. 3; see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
73. See Final Act, supra note 65, art. III, para. 4; see also Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 3, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144.
74. See id. art. III, para. 5.
75. See id. art. IV.
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and carries out the functions of the WTO. 76 The General Council
consists of representatives of all Contracting Parties, and
carries out the functions of the WTO only as shall be
appropriate in the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial
Conference. 77 Finally, the Secretariat consists of a DirectorGeneral 78 and staff, and the Ministerial Conference will define
79
its duties.
One of the most significant differences between the GATT
and the WTO lies in the new Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).80 This
new procedure for adjudicating international legal disputes is
set out in detail as compared to the relatively informal dispute
settlement procedure of the GATT. 8 l The DSU continues to rely
on Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT,8 2 but also significantly
expands the procedure's legal powers. 83 Because, unlike the
GATT system, the WTO is permanently chartered 4 and is the
exclusive source of procedure to solve disputes, 5 it will provide a
more flexible framework and reduce uncertainty in the system. 86
Additional changes from the GATT dispute settlement
system include the creation of an appellate body to review legal
issues settled by the panels, 87 and the automatic adoption by the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the panel report unless the
DSB decides by consensus 88 not to adopt the report.8 9 This
76. See id. art. IV, para. 1. The functions of the WTO include "the authority to
take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, if so
requested by a Member, in accordance with the specific requirements for decisionmaking" in the agreement. Id. The Dispute Settlement Body falls under the General
Council. See id. art. IV, para. 3.
77. See id. art. IV, para. 2.
78. See id. art. VI, paras. 1-2.
79. See id. art. VI, para. 3. The Final Act further instructs that the DirectorGeneral and staff of the Secretariat "shall refrain from any action which might
adversely reflect on their position as international officials." Id. at para. 4. As such
the Final Act demands that they not accept instructions from any government
external to the WTO and that members of the WTO respect the international
character and responsibilities of the Secretariat. See id.
80. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 2-3.
81. See id. see also Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 72.
82. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 72, art. 4, para. 11; see
also Khansari, supra note 3, at 190.
83. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 3.
84. See Scanlan, supra note 7, at 598.
85. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 72, art. 1, para. 1.
86. See Khansari, supra note 3, at 190.
87. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 72, art. 16, para. 4; see
also Hudec, supra note 1, at 3.
88. "The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter
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procedure will eliminate the ability of a single member to block
a panel decision using its veto power. Similarly, "by making
panel decisions valid law at the moment of inception, the DSU
seeks to eliminate much of the delay and subsequent lack of
compliance associated with the GATT's dispute settlement
mechanism."90
2.

Dispute Settlement Under the WTO

The DSU procedure under the WTO consists of five stages:
consultations, a panel, appellate review, arbitration, and
compensation.
Consultation
When a dispute arises pursuant to a covered agreement a
member must request a consultation. 91 The member implicated
by the request must then reply within ten days and enter into
consultations within thirty days. 92 The purpose of the
consultation is to attempt to obtain a satisfactory adjustment of
the matter. 93 If a member does not respond within ten days or
enter into consultation within thirty days, 94 or if the parties fail
to settle the dispute within sixty days, the complaining party
95
may request a panel.
The Panel Phase
Upon the request of a complaining party a panel will be
established. 96 In order to prevent panel blocking, the panel will

submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB
when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision." Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 72, art. 2, para. 4, n.1.
89. See id. art. 21, para. 4.
90. Ehansari, supra note 3, at 191.
91. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 72, art. 4, para. 3.
92. See id.
93. See id. art. 4, para. 5.
94. See id. art. 4, para. 3. In cases of urgency the time limits will be shortened.
See id.
95. See id. art. 4, para. 7. If the parties so choose they may enter into good
offices, conciliation, or mediation procedures to settle the dispute. See id. art. 5,
para. 1. If, after a sixty day period, these methods have failed to settle the dispute a
panel may be requested. See id. art. 5, para. 4.
96. See id. art. 6, para. 1. The request for a panel must be in writing and must
specifically identify the measures at issue and provide a summary of the legal basis
of the complaint. See id. art. 6, para. 2.
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be convened unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
establish one. 97 Panels will be composed of three well-qualified
individuals unless the parties to the dispute agree to a panel of
five. 98 The panelists are nominated by the Secretariat and the
parties to the dispute should not oppose the nominations except
for compelling reasons. 99 If, however, the parties cannot agree to
the composition of the panel within twenty days, the DirectorGeneral in conjunction with the DSB and the relevant Council
or Committee will appoint the panelists. 10 0
The purpose of the panel is to make an objective assessment
of the matter before it by examining the facts of the case and the
relevant covered agreements, in order to assist the DSB in
making recommendations or giving rulings. 1 1 The panel
accomplishes this task through confidential10 2 analysis 0of5
4
written submissions, 10 3 oral arguments, 0 expert witnesses,
0 6 The entire panel period is to last
and other relevant sources.
07
months.'
six
than
no more
Following oral arguments and rebuttal submissions, the
panel submits to the parties its findings.'08 After the parties
submit their comments regarding the findings, the panel
responds with an interim report. 10 9 This report includes the
panel's findings and conclusions."10 Unless a party requests that
97.
98.

See id. art. 6, para. 1
See id. art. 8, para. 5.

Well qualified individuals
[includes]
governmental and/or nongovernmental individuals, including persons who have served on or
presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or of a
contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or
Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in
the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as a senior trade policy official of a member.
Id. art. 8, para. 1. Note also that "[clitizens of Members whose governments are
parties to the dispute ... shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute..."
Id. art. 8, para. 3.
99. See id. art. 8, para. 6.
100. See id. art. 8, para. 7.
101. See id. art. 7.
102. See id. art. 14, para. 1 ("Panel deliberations shall be confidential.").
103. See id. art. 12, para. 6.
104. See id. art. 15, para. 1.
105. See id. art. 13, para. 2.
106. See id.
107. See id. art. 12, para. 8.
108. See id. art. 15, para. 1.
109. The parties have limited period of time, set by the panel, in which to submit
their comments in writing. See id.
110. See id. art. 15, para. 2.
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the panel review specific aspects of the interim report, it will be
considered the final report and circulated to members.1 11 Twenty
days after circulation members may consider adoption of the
report, but must submit any objections ten days prior to the
meeting at which the report will be considered. 1 2 Unless a party
to the dispute notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal or the
not to adopt the report, the report is
DSB decides by consensus
3
automatically adopted."
Appellate Review
Upon a party's decision to appeal the panel report, the
report will be referred to the Appellate Body.'1 4 The Appellate
Body is composed of seven persons of recognized authority," 5
"three of whom shall serve on any one case." 11 6 The appeal will
be limited to the issues of law covered in the panel report and
should not exceed sixty days in length." 7 The proceedings of the
Appellate Body will be confidential and the opinions expressed
are anonymous." 8 Unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the Appellate Body report, it will be adopted within thirty
days following its circulation to members." 19
Binding Arbitration
Upon consensus by both parties to a dispute, binding
arbitration may be utilized as an alternative means of dispute
resolution. 20 The parties involved must agree on the procedures
and abide by the arbitration award. 12' Arbitration awards are
provisions regarding
subject to the agreement's other
122
implementation and compensation.

111. See id.
112. See id. art. 16, paras. 1-2.
113. See id. art. 16, para. 4.
114. See id. art. 17, para. 1.
115. See id. art. 17, para. 3. "Persons of recognized authority" include those
'with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of
the covered agreements generally." Id. "They shall be unaffiliated with any
government." Id.
116. Id. art. 17, para. 1.
117. See id. art. 17, paras. 5-6.
118. See id. art. 17, paras. 10-11.
119. See id. art. 17, para. 14.
120. See id. art. 25, para. 1.
121. See id. art. 25, paras. 2-3.
122. See id. art. 25, para. 4.; see also id. arts. 21-22.
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Implementation and Compensation
If immediate compliance is impracticable, the DSU requires
compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB within
a reasonable time. 123 The reasonable time can be a period
proposed by the member concerned and approved by the DSB, a
period mutually agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, or a
period determined through binding arbitration ninety days after
the date of adoption of the recommended rulings. 124 In the event
of arbitration, "a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the
reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body
recommendations should not exceed fifteen months from the
25
date for adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report."
Regarding disagreements as to the adequacy of compliance with
WTO rulings, the DSU provides:
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through
recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever
possible resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate its report
within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it. 126

The DSB will continually monitor the implementation of
adopted rulings to ensure that it occurs within a reasonable
time.

127

In the event that a party fails to implement the
recommended measures, the member may be requested to enter
into negotiations with the complaining party in order to develop
mutually acceptable
compensation. 128 If no agreeable
compensation plan is developed, "any party having invoked the
dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from
the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of
concessions or other obligations
under the covered
129
agreements."

123. See id. art. 21, para. 3(a)-(c).
124. See id. Because this time period is specifically spelled out in the DSU it
leaves little room for ambiguity or delay, unlike the GATT system. See Scanlan,
supra note 7, at 603.
125. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 72, art. 21, para. 3(c).
126. Id. art. 21, para. 5.
127. See id. art. 21, para. 6.
128. See id. art. 22, para. 2.
129. Id.
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II. CURRENT EXAMPLES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
In the upcoming years, the WTO will face many tests in
regulating international trade and settling disputes between
member countries. One of the key factors in determining the
success of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism will be the
compliance achieved from member countries on the losing end of
disputes. 130 Already, clashes between the United States and the
European Union, have begun to result in delay and incomplete
compliance. Specifically, the current trade wars between these
two superpowers involving beef and bananas demonstrate the
difficulty the WTO may face in achieving compliance from
member countries on the losing end of a dispute. 13 1 If the WTO
fails to adequately deal with these compliance problems they
132
could undermine the entire new133dispute resolution system
and the organization's credibility.
A.

THE BANANA WAR

Although bananas have been at the center of international
disputes throughout the century, 134 the conflict between the
European Union and the United States over the tropical fruit
began in July 1993.135 Several European countries had been
providing their ex-colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific with preferential access to EU banana exports. 136 These
countries effectively discriminated against banana imports from
Central America. 37 Other European countries allowed
unrestricted trade or instituted other import regimes, resulting

130. See Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push-Me, PullYou: The Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding,32 INT'L LAW. 755, 786-88 (1998).
131. See id. at 787.
132. See Fight Over Banana Trade Escalates, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 30, 1998, at A14.
133. See Frances Williams, U.S. Steps up Banana Battle with EU, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1998, at 8.
134. See Gordon Fairclough & Darren McDermott, The Banana Business is
Rotten, So Why Do People Fight Over It?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al
(explaining that "[flor more than a century, [bananas] have provoked riots and
coups" and that "[t]roops have been dispatched to protect them.").
135. See Guy de Jonqui~res, Bananas Battle Goes to the Brink, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
11, 1998, at 6.
136. See James M. Cooper, Spirits In The Material World: A Post-Modern
Approach to United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 957, 970 (1999).
(citing Expelled from Eden, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 35, 36) and (citing Banana
Split, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at 19). See also Guy de Jonqui~res, supra note 135.
137. See Guy de Jonquires, supra note 135.
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in a patchwork of national policies. 138 In 1993 the European
Union decided to unify these policies by introducing a single
139
common market called the European Union Banana Regime.
This new regime set up a structured tariff quota system to
imports from countries that were not ex-colonies. 140 It also
established import licenses preferential to former colonial
lands.' 4 ' Europe's new banana regime angered leading United
States distributors of Central American bananas, who saw a
decline in their profits after the introduction of the new tariffs
142
and quotas.
Prior to the 1993 adoption of the European Union Banana
Regime, the United States, in conjunction with several Central
American banana producers, complained to the GATT regarding
Europe's patchwork of preferential treatment. 143 Initial
consultations failed between the then European Economic
Community (EEC) and the United States. 14 Although a GATT
panel eventually held that the various EEC banana import
regimes violated certain GATT provisions, 145 the contracting
parties did not adopt the report, due to continual blocks by the
EEC. 146 The Caribbean banana producers brought another
complaint to the GATT shortly after the adoption of the
European Union Banana Regime. 147 Once again the GATT panel
ruled that the new regime remained inconsistent with GATT
provisions, 148 but the EEC blocked adoption of the panel
report. 149
With the creation of the WTO and its new dispute
resolution mechanism, the United States and Central American
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Zsolt K Bessko, Going Bananas Over EEC Preferences?:A Look at the
Banana Trade War and the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 265, 273 (1996).
141. See Cooper, supra note 136, at 971.
142. See Guy de Jonquidres, supra note 135.
143. See id.
144. See Bessko, supra note 140, at 286.
145. See id. Specifically, the panel found that the "quota restrictions on bananas
were inconsistent with Article XII's prohibition of quantitative restrictions." Id. at
274. It also found the tariff preferences inconsistent with Article I's most-favored
nation clause. See id. at 276.
146. See Bessko, supra note 140, at 275.
147. See id. at 276.
148. See id. at 276-79. This time the panel held that "the measures taken by the
EEC under its new banana import regime constituted a prima facie case of
nullification or impairment of benefits under Article XXIII..." Id. at 279.
149. See id. at 279.
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banana producers needed not fear blockage by the European
150
Union, since the panel report is now adopted automatically.
In 1996 the United States joined with Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Mexico to challenge the EU Banana Regime
before the WTO. 15 1 In May of 1997 the WTO issued a panel
report finding that the EU's "banana import regime and its
licensing procedures for the importation of bananas were
inconsistent with various obligations of the GATT 1994 and
related WTO agreements." 5 2
Refusing to accept the initial decision of the WTO dispute
settlement process, the European Union soon announced its
decision to appeal the ruling. 15 3 By September of 1997 the WTO
Appellate Body had issued and adopted a report upholding most
aspects of the panel decision. 5 4 This decision meant that the
the WTO ruling or
European Union either had to comply with
55
face retaliation from the United States.
Initially the European Union split as to the implementation
of the required changes. 56 Some countries pushed for
alternatives to compliance, such as payment of compensation to
the complaining members, while other countries expressed
support for implementation. 15 7 Despite the split, the European
Union announced that it would accept the verdict of the WTO
and would make future decisions regarding implementation of
the ruling. 5 8 While the European Union refused to disclose any
details of its implementation plan, it insisted on maintaining
some trade preferences established in its banana regime. 59 In
response the United States commented that it would settle for
WTO ruling and
nothing less than full implementation of the
60
that compensation would not be acceptable.
150. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 72 and accompanying
text.
151. See Cooper, supra note 136, at 971.
152. Reif& Florestal, supra note 130, at 776.
153. See Frances Williams, EU Appeals Against WTO Banana Ruling, FIN.
TIMES, June 12, 1997, at 6.
154. See Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 776-77. The report was issued on
September 9, 1997 and was adopted by the DSB on September 15, 1997. See id.
155. See Cooper, supra note 136, at 971.
156. See Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 777.
157. See id.
158. See Frances Williams, EU Accepts Ruling on Banana Regime, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1997, at 5. The European Union initially stated that it would make a

statement on how it intended to implement the WTO decision at its next meeting in
October of 1997. See id.
159.

See id.

160.

See id. Specifically, "[t]he United States declared that it would accept only a
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Dissatisfied with the European Union's failure to specify its
plans for implementation, the United States, Honduras,
Guatemala, Ecuador and Mexico requested binding arbitration
in November 1997.161 The arbitrator held that "the EC would
have fifteen months and one week to implement the WTO
1 62
decision and bring its banana import regime into compliance."
In January 1998 the European Union adopted a proposal to
modify its banana regime. 163 While the new proposal contained
some changes, 164 the United States contended that it remained
just as discriminatory as the previous regime. 165 The United
States again asserted its desire to see the European Union
166
abolish the entire regime.
Based on its belief that the EU plan for implementation
failed "'to make any significant changes to bring the [EU's]
regime in line with WTO provisions,'"' 167 the United States in
July 1998 asked that the new regime go back to the WTO panel
for a ruling. 168 This was the first time that a panel had been
169
asked to judge a disputed settlement and implementation.
The United States further maintained that if the European
Union did not comply with the WTO ruling by its January 1999
deadline, it would impose sanctions no later than March 1999.170
The European Union responded by stating that it would only
full dismantling of the EC banana regime." Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 777.
161. See Reif& Florestal, supra note 130, at 778.
162. See id. at 778.
163. See id. at 779.
164. See id. at 779-80.
The EC's proposal is almost as byzantine as the existing regime...
However, it is notable in two key respects: (1) it appears to hold out the
promise of shifting existing quota allocations in a way that favors, to some
extent, certain complainants in the case over or more than others; and (2)
the proposal does so in a manner that is far from clear and depends to a
large extent on bilateral negotiations between the EC and each of the
winning WTO Members.

Id.
165. See Frances Williams, U.S. to Seek WTO Ruling on EU BananaPlans, FIN.
TIMES, July 24, 1998, at 6.
166. See Reif& Florestal, supra note 130, at 780.
167. Id. (quoting Office of the Trade Representative, USTR Barshefsky Reacts to
EU Banana Decision, Press Release 98-63).
168. See Williams, supra note 165.
169. See id.
170. See Frances Williams, WTO Enters Uncharted Territory, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1998, at 9. The United States believed that it did not have to wait for a panel
ruling before asking for WTO authorization to retaliate against the European Union.
See Frances Williams, EU and U.S. locked in Negotiations, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1998, at 7 [hereinafter Locked in Negotiations].
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agree to the panel if the United States dropped its threat of
17 1
sanctions, thus delaying the establishment of such a panel.
In January 1999, the United States notified the WTO that
it would not back away from its intentions to suspend
concessions on particular products totaling almost $570 million
in trade. 172 The WTO agreed that a panel should rule on
whether the EU's amended banana import regime complies with
the previous WTO judgments. 173 By the end of January, the EU
asked for WTO arbitration to review the proposed sanctions and
the United States suspended the threatened trade sanctions
until March. 174 The WTO stated that the arbitrator would
produce a decision regarding the proposed sanctions on March 2,
1999 and the panel would reach a result regarding the new
banana import regime by April 12, 1999.175
On March 2, 1999 the WTO arbitrators returned with an
unexpected delay and requested more time and information to
assess the amount of sanctions. 76 Frustrated by the delays, the
United States announced that it would begin imposing 100
77
percent duties on $520 million of selected European exports.
The United States stated that "it is time for the EU to bear
some of the consequences for its complete disregard for its
GATT and WTO obligations." 7 8 The European Union responded
that the United States could not impose such sanctions until the
WTO had pronounced its amended regime illegal. 79 It further
171. See Locked in Negotiations, supra note 170. Similarly, "[t]he United States
attempted to present its unilateral measures per the DSU, but faced a number of
procedural delays from other Contracting Parties." Cooper, supra note 136, at 972.
172. See Frances Williams, WTO Orders Review but Fails to Cool Tempers, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at 4.
173. See id.
174. See Frances Williams, U.S. Postpones Sanctions on EU Over Bananas,FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1999, at 5.
175. See Frances Williams, U.S. Preparesfor Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1999, at 4.
176. See Frances Williams, Banana DecisionDelay Wrongfoots U.S., FIN. TIMES,
March 3, 1999, at 6.
177. See Frances Williams, WTO Calls Meeting on Banana Row, FIN. TIMES,
March 6, 1999, at 3.
178. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United
States Takes Customs Action on European Imports, Press Release 99-17 (Mar. 3
1999), at http://192.239.92.165/releases/1999/03/99-17.html (visited Oct. 13, 1999).
179. The European Union also asked for an additional WVTO panel to rule on the
controversial Section 301 of U.S. trade law. See Frances Williams, Brussels Seeks
WTO Ruling on U.S. Trade Sanctions Law, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at 3. The
United States was using section 301 to invoke unilateral trade sanctions against the
European Union. See id. EU officials contended that the timetable laid down in
section 301 was not compatible with retaliation procedures in the WTO. See id.
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contended that the sanctions displayed "blatant disregard" for
1 80
the WTO's multilateral settlement procedures.
Worried that the standoff between the European Union and
the United States regarding the banana regime would
undermine the authority of the dispute settlement system, the
WTO members urged the two superpowers to resolve their
dispute.18 1 The standoff continued, however, until an April 1999
ruling by the WTO holding that the amended banana import
regime failed to comply with previous WTO rulings. 8 2 The
arbitration panel did rule, however, that the United States had
over-estimated the costs of the regime to the United States
economy.183 By the end of April, the WTO had formally
authorized the United States to impose $191.4 million in trade
sanctions against European goods as retaliation. 18 This
represented the first time in more than fifty years that
authorization to retaliate against a member country has been
granted by the WTO or the GATT.185 The United States insisted
that retaliation was only a last resort measure designed to push
86
the European Union into compliance.
In response to the negative ruling, the European Union
announced that it would comply with the WTO's previous
ruling. 8 7 The WTO formally adopted the panel verdict in May
1999.188 While the European Union decided not to appeal the
verdict, it claimed it might take until January 2000 to find a
solution. 8 9 The European Union began consulting with other
WTO members regarding the solution to the banana import
regime, but admitted in July 1999 that further delays in
180. See Williams, supra note 177.
181. See Frances Williams, WTO Urges Brussels and U.S. to Resolve Banana
Trade Dispute, FIN. TIMES, March 9, 1999, at 24.
182. See Frances Williams, Outcome Seen as Opportunity for Reform, FIN.
TIMES, April 8, 1999, at 6.
183. See id.
184. See Frances Williams, U.S. Wins Formal Authorisation for Sanctions, FIN.
TIMES, April 13, 1999, at 4.
185. See Frances Williams, EU 'Needs 8 Months' to End Banana Crisis, FIN.
TIMES, April 20, 1999, at 9.
186. See id.
187. See Frances Williams, Panel to Condemn EU Regime, FIN. TIMES, April 28,
1999, at 8.
188. See Frances Williams, WTO Issues Formal Verdict, FIN. TIMES, May 7,
1999, at 9.
189. See supra note 179. The United States responded by stating that it was
prepared to lift sanctions as soon as a solution was implemented. See id. The
European Union further warned that it would be difficult to find a solution that
satisfied all the competing interests. See id.
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implementing reforms remained likely. 190
Again in September 1999 the European Union warned that
they were experiencing difficulties in devising changes to the
European Union's banana imports regime. 191 There remained a
split between those European countries that wanted to maintain
a strong protection for former colonies and those European

countries pushing for compliance with the WTO ruling. 192 By the
end of September the European Union announced that it would
implement a tariff-only system if trading partners and EU
members continued to disagree on how to change the current
illegal import regime. 193 The United States indicated that it
would consider the system, provided that it was not prohibitive,
although some Central American countries felt that tariff
preferences alone would not be enough to keep their bananas
194
competitive in the European market.
In November 1999, the Caribbean banana exporters and
Ecuador agreed to a tariff rate quota arrangement that they

hoped would satisfy United States concerns about the European
Union's import regime. 195 Unfortunately,

this arrangement

appeared to be possibly incompatible with the rules of the
WTO.196 As a result, the European Union proposed a "first come,

first served" tariff-only regime, which would eliminate all quotas
by 2006.197 This discriminatory tariff-only policy, however,
198

would likely reduce EU imports of Latin American bananas.

By mid-November the European Union stood firmly by its tariff190. See Frances Williams, Reforms to EU BananaImport Regime Delayed, FIN.
TIMES, July 27, 1999, at 8. Although EU officials had previously said that
recommendations regarding reforms would be made in July 1999, it admitted that it
would note be able to make proposals until September 1999 when the new EU
Commission takes office. See id.
191. See Frances Williams, EU Warns of Delay in Reforming Banana Import
Regime, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at 6.
192. See id. Those countries favoring protection of former colonies included the
United Kingdom , France and Spain, while the countries favoring a more liberalized
market included Germany and the Netherlands. See id.
193. See Frances Williams, Tariff-only System Mooted, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1999, at 7.
194. See id.
195. See Caunte James, Banana Deal May Satisfy U.S., FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1999, at 18.
196. See id.
197. See Brent Borell, A Brussels Solution that is Bananas:A Proposed Tariff
that Discriminates against Latin America Will Exacerbate the Trade Dispute with
the U.S., FIN. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at 25; Michael Smith, Brussels Draws Blueprint
to End Banana War, FIN. TIMES, October 25, 1999, at 7; Mike Smith, U.S. Rejects
Brussels' Proposalon Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at 14.
198. See Borell, supra note 197.
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only system despite acknowledging that the banana exporting
199
countries would prefer a tariff rate regime.
Frustrated with the European Union's latest unsatisfactory
proposal to end its current import regime, Ecuador "became the
first developing country to use the sanctions provisions of the
World Trade Organization when it asked the WTO to approve
retaliation worth $450 million" for what it described as "blatant
non-compliance." 20 0 By March of 2000 tensions had only
increased. First, a WTO panel ruled in favor of the European
Union in its complaint that the United States violated
international trade rules in their on-going banana dispute by
imposing sanctions against EU companies before obtaining
WTO authorization. 20 1 Second, in a landmark ruling by the
WTO, Ecuador had been given approval to administer its
202
requested trade sanctions against the European Union.
By the summer of 2000 the European Union had not
reached a satisfactory decision on how to implement the WTO
ruling that its banana import regime illegally discriminated
against certain Central American countries. 20 3 Indeed, the
European Union seems content to continue implementing
discriminatory regimes to the dissatisfaction of the banana
exporters. The United States expects continued delays and
compliance may not be reached until sometime later in the
decade. Similarly, the United States banana industry has begun
placing increased pressure on the United States government to
impose strict sanctions.20 4 As a result the United States
sanctions imposed in retaliation appear likely to stay in place
20 5
for several months.
B.

THE BEEF HORMONES DISPUTE

During the 1980s the presence of certain growth hormones
199. See Mike Smith, Brussels Proposes New Regime for Bananas, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1999, at 14.
200. Frances Williams, Ecuador Seeks to Retaliate in Banana Dispute, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1999, at 7.
201. See Frances Williams, WTO Raps U.S. Over Banana Dispute Sanctions,
FIN. TIMES, March 16, 2000, at 12.
202. See Frances Williams and Edward Alden, Ecuador Sanctions PleaBacked,
FIN. TIMES (LONDON), March 18, 2000, at 2.

203. See Michael Smith, EU Slips Up Over Import of Bananas, FIN. TIMES, July
18, 2000, at 16.
204. See Edward Alden, U.S. Industry Pushes for Sanctions Against EU, FIN.
TIMES, August 23, 2000, at 10.
205. See Williams, supra note 190.
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in European meat products used in baby food caused severe
defects in infants. 20 6 The European Community reacted by
instituting a ban on the use of certain hormones in European
cattle and imported beef.20 7 The United States, on the other
hand, has been using natural and synthetic hormones on
livestock for several decades. 20 8 While the health effects of the
residual hormones in beef consumed by humans remains
unknown, some scientific research has suggested that such
consumption may be carcinogenic, may increase20 9the effects of
other carcinogens, and may reduce male fertility.
As members of the WTO and the GATT, the European
Union and United States are obligated to prevent trade
discrimination by treating domestic and foreign products
similarly.210 At the same time, however, WTO member countries
may discriminate in order to protect public health. The ability of
a member to adopt food safety measures falls under the WTO
Agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement). 211 The SPS Agreement allows a
member to lawfully discriminate in situations that help protect
212
health and the environment.
The SPS Agreement presumes the legality of protectionist
measures based on internationally accepted standards. 21 3 For
those measures not supported by internationally accepted
standards, the SPS Agreement requires that the measure be
justified by scientific evidence of harmful effects of the regulated
product. 21 4 The purpose of requiring such scientific evidence is to

206. See Layla Hughes, Limiting the Jurisdictionof Dispute Settlement Panels:
The WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormone Decision, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L' REV. 915,
916 (1998). The specific hormone believed to have caused the defects was
diethylstilbene (DES). See id. This was found to cause premature development of
breasts and menstruation in infants. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 917.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and
PhytosanitaryAgreement: The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
89, 90-91 (1998).
213. See Huges, supra note 206, at 917.
214. See id. "The SPS Agreement also requires Members to avoid arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection they consider appropriate in
different situations, such as the acceptable amounts of residue from different
hormones present in beef, 'if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade'." Id. (quoting Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-4, art. 5 para. 5

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 10: 133

prevent the use of these measures as disguised discriminatory
215
barriers to trade.
In 1996, the United States filed a complaint with the WTO
alleging that the EU import ban on hormone-induced beef could
not be sustained under the SPS Agreement. 2 16 The United
States made three basic claims in its argument: (1) "the
precautionary principle was not sufficiently developed in
international law to be relevant to the interpretation of the SPS
Agreement;" (2) the hormone ban was not supported by
scientific facts showing the harmful effects of hormone induced
beef; and (3) the ban "adopted arbitrary distinctions among the
levels of protection appropriate in different situations." 2 7 The
United States did not argue that health standards higher than
the international consensus violated the SPS Agreement, but
reiterated that such measures must be based on scientific
evidence. 218 Indeed, scientific evidence existing at the time of the
complaint remained insufficient to prove that residue from
hormones poses a health risk to human consumers. 2 19 The
European Union argued, however, that the hormone ban could
still be considered permissible in light of general information
pointing to the negative effects of hormone consumption and
that it was justified in exercising caution in situations of
220
scientific uncertainty.
(Dec. 15, 1993)).
215. See McNeil, supra note 212, at 90.
216. See Huges, supra note 206, at 917. The specific directive challenged by the
United States "prohibits the administration of certain growth promotion hormones
to farm animals, bans the sale for domestic and imported meat from animals that
received these hormones, and allows an exception for meat from animals that
received hormone treatment for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes." Id. (citing
Council Directive 96/22, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3).
The beef dispute reflects profoundly different views in the United States
and Europe over altered or adulterated foods. European fear of food
tampering increased with the outbreak of 'mad cow' disease in Britain
several years ago. More recently, those anxieties intensified over a scandal
in Belgium over chicken and other food products contaminated with the
cancer-causing chemical dioxin.
Elizabeth Olson, U.S. and Canada Get $125 Million Ruling on Europe Beef Ban,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1999, at C4.
217. See Huges, supra note 206, at 918 (citing Appellate Body report, GATT Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R, paras. 49, 52, 122).
218. See Nancy Dunne, U.S. Hits at EU on Food Safety, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1998, at 6.
219. See Huges, supra note 206, at 917.
220. See id. citing GATT Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, note 4, para. 121. Specifically the
EU pointed to the precautionary principle, which justifies the exercise of such
caution by regulatory agencies in the event of scientific uncertainty. See id. The
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In August of 1997, the WTO panel addressing the United
States complaint ruled that the EU ban on meat produced with
221
growth promoting hormones created an unfair trade barrier.
The United States hailed the victory as a signal that the WTO
can handle complex disputes in which a WTO member attempts
to justify trade barriers by disguising them as health
measures. 222 On the other hand, the European Union expressed
concern that the panel's conclusions limit the right of
governments to determine the level of protection that they deem
223
to be appropriate for their consumers.
In September 1997, the European Union launched its
224
appeal of the panel ruling striking down its beef hormone ban.
It defended the ban on the grounds that governments have the
fundamental right to choose the level of health protection they
consider necessary for their citizens. 225 The European Union
also argued that the WTO ignored the testimony of two experts
supporting the claim that hormone consumption posed
226
legitimate health risks.
The WTO issued an Appellate Body decision in January
1998 affirming the result of the earlier panel ruling, but
overturning some aspects of its reasoning. 227 Both the United
States and the European Union claimed victories based on the
decision. 228 The European Union claimed that the decision gives
229
it the right to establish a scientific basis for its hormone ban.
As such the European Union initially stated that it would
European Union further maintained that "the precautionary principle, as a part of
international law, mandates that any interpretation of the requirement of scientific
justification in the SPS Agreement must not include a requirement for specific,

definitive scientific evidence before protective measures against the beef can be
justified." Id. at 917-18.
221. See Nancy Dunne, WTO Confirms Hormone Ruling, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1997, at 4.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See Neil Buckley, EU to Launch Appeal over WTO Beef Ruling, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1997, at 7.
225. See Neil Buckley, EU Defends Ban on Hormone-TreatedBeef, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1997, at 3.
226. See id. Although two experts did back the EU view that consumption of
hormone residue in beef leads to health risks, three other experts did not share this
opinion. See id. The European Union argues that it was wrong of the WTO to base
decisions regarding human health issues on majority scientific views. See id.

227. See Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 781-82. The DSB adopted the
appellate decision in February 1998. See id.
228.

See Daniel Dombey, EU and U.S. Claim Beef 'Victory,' FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16,

1998, at 4.
229.

See Dunne, supra note 218.
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maintain the ban for at least fifteen months while it conducted
scientific studies and considered plans to implement the WTO
ruling. 230
The
European
Union then
proposed
an
implementation timetable of two and one half years. 231
Conversely, the United States interpreted the appellate ruling
232
as requiring immediate termination of the hormone ban.
According to the United States, failure to remove the ban would
seriously threaten the effectiveness of the WTO dispute
233
settlement mechanism.
As in the banana dispute both parties were frustrated with
the inability to agree upon an implementation time period and
submitted the controversy to WTO arbitration. 234 In April 1998
the arbitrator ruled that the European Union had fifteen
months to comply with the previous WTO ruling. 2 5 Again the
United States claimed that this ruling required the European
Union to lift its ban.2 36 Similarly, the European Union
responded that the ruling showed it could keep the ban intact
while it pursued scientific evidence in its support. 237
Throughout the latter months of 1998 tensions increased
between the United States and the European Union.2 38 Each
party threatened to retaliate against the other's exports. 239 By
the end of the year the United States began considering trade
sanctions against the European Union for not properly
complying with the rulings of the WTO. 240 At the same time the
European Union remained insistent that it would not repeal the
ban until it had completed a scientific risk assessment. 241
After European veterinary experts found hormone residues
in meat certified as hormone free, the European Union, in April
230. See Frances Williams, EU Loses Hormones Case, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998,
at 2.
231. See Reif& Florestal, supra note 130, at 782.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See Michael Smith, EU Told it has 15 Months to Comply with WTO Rule,
FIN. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at 7. The WTO ruling was held retroactive to February
1998, meaning that the European Union would have to bring its hormone ban into
compliance by May 1999. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See Guy de Jonqui~res, Bananas and Beef Take Trade Conflict to the Brink,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at 8.
239. See id.
240. See id. These considerations come at relatively the same time that the
United States began looking into retaliation in the banana dispute.
241. See Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 782.
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1999, announced plans to ban all beef imported from the United
States. 242 This decision increased tensions with the United
States who claimed that the proposed ban would violate WTO
rules because it was not supported by scientific evidence that all
beef from the United States posed a health risk.243 Furthermore,
in May 1999, the European Union categorically ruled out lifting
its ban on meat treated with hormones. 2 " The European Union
claimed that it based its decision on a new study identifying the
health risks of hormones. 245 In response, the United States
labeled the study's findings as misleading 246 and stated that "the
European Union appeared not to be serious about meeting its
WTO obligations." 247 The United States further announced that
Union failed to
there would be a "price to pay" if the European
248
comply with its May 13, 1999 deadline.
Indeed, the United States announced on May 14, 1999 that
it would seek authorization from the WTO to impose 100
percent tariffs on $202 million of EU exports. 249 The European
242. See Michael Smith and Nancy Dunne, Europe May Ban All U.S. Beef as
New Trade Dispute Looms, FIN. TIMES, April 22, 1999, at 26; see also Edmund L.
Andrews, Europeans ThreatenBan on U.S. Beef Imports, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1999,
at C8 (indicating that about 12 percent of the samples from U.S. beef contained
enough hormone residue to indicate that they came from cattle raised with
hormones).
243. See id.
244. See Guy de Jonquidres, EU Digs in for Beef War with the U.S., FIN. TIMES,
May 5, 1999, at 5.
245. See id.
246. See id. The United States further claimed that the findings were at odds
with the overwhelming weight of international scientific evidence that growth
promoting hormones "posed no health risk if properly administered to cattle." Id.
247. See id. The European Union further commented that it would not be able to
comply with its May 13 deadline because the results of further scientific studies
would not be ready until the end of 1999. See id. The European Union has said,
however, that it would offer temporary compensation for lost exports until the
studies are completed. See id.
248. See Mark Suzman and Michael Smith, EU Refuses to Bow to Beef Deadline,
FIN. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at 6.
249. See Guy de Jonqui~res, U.S. Starts to Play the Long Game on Dispute over
Hormone-Treated Meat Exports to EU, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at 5. After the
United States had received criticism for jumping the gun in imposing sanctions in
the banana dispute, it chose to handle the beef dispute somewhat differently. See id.
The United States delayed disclosing the exact products it would target with the
sanctions. See id. It announced that it intended to take a more gradual approach to
the situation so that it might increase pressure for the European Union to lift the
ban. See id. After all, the United States had previously said that it wished not to
pursue compensation, but an end to the hormone ban. See Bruce Clark, U.S. Hails
EU Beef Imports Ruling by WTO, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 1997, at 2.
U.S. officials say their gradualist tactics are intended to keep EU member
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Union immediately labeled the amount as excessive and
announced that it would ask a WTO arbitrator to review the
United States claim. 250 In June 1999, WTO arbitrators
authorized the United States to implement sanctions on $128
million in European exports. 251 At the same time, the European
Union agreed to postpone its ban on all United States beef after
assurance from the United States that the beef would be more
252
closely monitored to ensure that it did not contain hormones.
This concession was short lived as the European Union
again angered the United States in September 1999 by
announcing that it would likely need a year before returning to
the WTO to seek a resolution of the hormone dispute. 2 3 As of
March 2000, the European Union had not completed the
seventeen studies it ordered to find scientific support for its
hormone ban. 254 It did, however, state its desire to renew serious
negotiations in 2000 and establish clear criteria for banning
products on health and safety grounds when there is no
conclusive evidence that they are dangerous. 255 The European
Union continues to assert its opinion that there is a growing
body of evidence supporting the proposition that consumption 2 of
56
hormone induced beef can lead to serious health risks.
Similarly, the United States continues to assert its
disappointment with the European Union's failure to comply
with the WTO ruling.25 7 Because no consensus has been reached

regarding

proper compliance with

the WTO ruling, the

states off guard and increase pressure on them to lift the ban. However,
recent experience has also taught Washington that rushing into combat
with all guns blazing would be unlikely to achieve this objective - and
could prove self-defeating.
de Jonqui~res, supra.
250. See Guy de Jonqui(res, EU to Challenge Level of U.S. Beef Sanctions, FIN.
TIMES, May 18, 1999, at 8. The United States formally requested sanctions on June
3, 1999. See International Staff, U.S. Move Expected Today, FIN. TIMES, June 3,
1999, at 5.
251. See Mark Suzman and Michael Smith, U.S. to Apply Sanctions over EU
Meat Ban, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at 6.
252. See Michael Smith and Gordon Cramb, European Union Postpones Ban on
all U.S. Beef Imports, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at 6.
253. See Michael Smith, Washington Hits at Delay in EU Case over Beef, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at 7.
254. See id.
255. See Guy de Jonquires, Brussels Aims to Clarify Safety Ban Criteria, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at 12; Frances Williams, EU Keen to Start Talks on Farm
Trade, FIN. TIMES, March 14, 2000, at 12.
256. See de Jonqui~res, supra note 244.
257. See id.
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European Union's hormone ban will likely remain intact far into
this century.
C.

COMPLIANCE ISSUES RAISED BY THE BANANA AND BEEF
DISPUTES

The disputes between the United States and the European
Union regarding bananas and beef pose two of the toughest
tests of the WTO's ability to achieve compliance from
superpower nations. As each of these disputes have run the
course of the WTO dispute settlement process and remain
unresolved, they suggest several areas of concern regarding rule
compliance. First, the cases show that substantial differences
can exist between the views of the winning member and the
losing member with respect to the losing member's
obligations. 258 These differences can result in delay and further
complications with compliance. Second, the two sides also differ
regarding the proper procedure for determining the losing
member's compliance obligations. 59 Third, the speed with which
compliance must occur remains unsettled. 260 Finally, these cases
suggest that more powerful countries will chose to accept
sanctions or compensation rather than comply with unfavorable
WTO rulings.
The banana dispute in particular demonstrates the
difficulties caused by disagreements among parties as to what
constitutes full compliance. After the United States had
achieved a positive WTO ruling in the Banana dispute, the
European Union was to design and implement a new banana
import regime. 261 While the United States demanded abolition of
the banana import regime, the European Union attempted to
interpret the WTO ruling in a manner that would allow an
amended regime to continue. 262 However, its new regime
remained just as discriminatory as the first, and was again
struck down by the WTO dispute settlement body. 263 Political
frictions within the European Union itself led to further
difficulties in creating a viable solution. 264 Ultimately, the
inability of the European Union and the United States to come
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 756.
de Jonqui~res, supra note 244.
Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 786.
Cooper, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
Williams, supra note 188 and accompanying text.
supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
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to an agreement regarding compliance with the WTO ruling led
to delays and non-compliance. Although the United States did
not prefer compensation to settle this dispute, it was forced to
adopt sanctions. 265 At this time, compliance with the WTO
ruling remains doubtful due to disagreement as to what full
compliance actually entails. Without more specific rulings
detailing what is meant by full compliance, losing members will
continue to interpret the rulings in a way that leads to noncompliance.
The banana dispute also demonstrates the role of politics in
WTO compliance. 266 Political dynamics within the European
Union compounded the difficulties in achieving compliance and
added to the delays. 267 Similarly, the implementation process
itself provides opportunities for the losing party to delay
compliance through the use of political strategies within the
WTO. 268 For example, it may convince one of the winning
members that full compliance would not be in its best
interest. 269 Politics external and internal to the WTO will
continue to play a key role in future compliance issues.
The beef hormone dispute also demonstrates the difficulties
confronted by disagreements over the proper interpretation of
WTO decisions. Specifically, the hormone case calls into
question the proper procedure for dealing with such
disagreements. The United States insists that the decision of
the WTO requires the European Union to lift its hormone ban,
while the European Union believes that the decision allows it to
keep the ban in place and attempt to justify it by conducting
scientific research. 270 Because the two parties disagreed on how
the fifteen-month implementation period should be used,
further delays occurred and the hormone ban was not brought
into compliance. Again the United States instituted sanctions,
despite its desire to see the ban lifted. Some commentators have
argued that the implementation period will become "a defacto
265. See supra notes 166, 183-90 and accompanying text.
266. See Reif & Florestal, supra note 130, at 780.
267. See id.
268. See id. Reif and Florestal argue that the political dynamics with the WTO
provide an avenue for "slowing, mitigating, or derailing the impact of a panel or
Appellate Body decision on a domestic measure." Id. at 780-81.
269. See id. Reif and Florestal argue that this is precisely what has happened in
the banana dispute. See id. The European Union has attempted to do this by
"arguing that by pressing for full implementation, the United States would be
responsible for the death of the Caribbean banana industry and attendant economic,
political and social consequences." See id. at 781.
270. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
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remand to the losing [m]ember, in which, at the end of the
implementation period, the [m]ember's action is reviewed by the
original panel for adequacy with the panel and/or Appellate
Body's original decision." 271 Such a consequence would render
the reasonable time requirement of the DSU ineffective.2 7 2 The
losing party to a WTO decision would know that it has over a
year to reinterpret the decision and find an implementation
method that skirts the desire of the winning party and falls
short of full compliance. Without more stringent application of
the DSU procedure, non-compliance will become more common.
The two disputes have also brought to light the unsettled
issue of the compliance timeframe. 273 In each of the two disputes
there existed an initial question as to how long the reasonable
time for compliance would be. Each case went to arbitration to
determine the issue and each resulted in a fifteen-month time
frame. While these decisions helped to clarify the WTO's
interpretation of a reasonable time, they also saw the losing
party fail to achieve full compliance within that time frame.2 7 4 A
clear definition of reasonable time will be of little consequence if
the losing party has no intention of complying with the WTO
decision.
Finally, the disputes over beef and bananas show that the
EU, and possibly others, may prefer to see the imposition of
sanctions rather than comply with the WTO ruling. This
disturbing trend will seriously undermine the effectiveness of
the WTO dispute settlement process. Although the European
Union has stopped short of outright rejection of the negative
decisions, it has interpreted decisions in a way than falls short
of full compliance and has caused lengthy delays. If disputes
between the United States and European Union continually
follow a lengthy process and result simply in the imposition of
sanctions, member countries may be deterred from utilizing the
WTO as the proper method of dispute resolution.

271.
272.
text.
273.
274.

See Reif& Florestal, supra note 130, at 783.
See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 128 and accompanying
See Reif& Florestal, supra note 130, at 786.
See supranotes 195-96 and 251-52and accompanying text.
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III. FACTORS OF COMPLIANCE: PROBLEMS WITH THE
SYSTEM, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES,
AND THE THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY
In addition to the compliance issues raised by the banana
and beef disputes, several other factors may help determine the
ability of the DSU to achieve compliance from losing parties to
disputes. Certain structural aspects of the dispute settlement
system lend themselves to greater non-compliance. On the other
hand, several WTO experts argue that international pressures
may be enough to assure compliance in the world trade
market. 275 Finally, many nations have espoused fear of loss of
sovereignty with the advent of the WTO. Such a fear may
manifest itself through lesser compliance with WTO rulings.
A.

PROBLEMS WITH THE SYSTEM

One of the most significant differences between the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism and that instituted under the
GATT involves the creation of panels and adoption of their
rulings. Each dispute settlement system begins with
consultation and negotiation between the two parties. Upon the
failure of this process, each system allows the formation of
panels to resolve the dispute. Under the GATT, parties to a
dispute had the ability to block panel formation or prevent the
adoption of the panel ruling.276 The panel ruling would only be
adopted by a unanimous vote of the contracting parties.2 7 This
procedure changed under the WTO. A party to a dispute could
not block the creation of a panel. 27 8 Similarly, a party no longer
has the power to singularly veto the adoption of a panel
ruling. 279 The panel ruling becomes binding on both parties.
The new procedure under the WTO has resulted in the
creation of fewer panels. One leading WTO expert suggests two
275. See generally Hudec, supra note 1; Jackson, supra note 9; Schaefer, supra
note 52; Gary Horlick, Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Will the United States Play by
the Rules? 29 J. WORLD TRADE 163 (1995).

276.

See Khansari, supra note 24 and accompanying text.

277.

See id.

278. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 97 and accompanying
text. "If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest
at the DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on
the DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to
establish a panel." Id.
279. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
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possible explanations for the reduction in panel formation under
the WTO. First, the binding quality of the new procedure may
28 0
persuade governments to remove illegal practices voluntarily.
Second, governments may use legal complaints as negotiating
tactics without the intention of actually carrying through with
28
litigation. '
Obviously, the binding nature of the WTO dispute
resolution procedure has had strong effects in settling disputes.
Once a complaint is brought against a party, that party can
avoid the panel process through negotiation, but no longer has
the ability to block the panel process. In the case where a party
suffers a negative panel ruling it may bring an appeal. 28 2 If the
party is not successful upon appeal it usually has three options:
(1) compliance with the WTO ruling; (2) maintenance of its
illegal practice while compensating the losing party for its loss;
or (3) complete disregard of the ruling. 28 3 The disputes regarding
beef and bananas have each resulted in the losing party
choosing to disregard the WTO ruling.
The main objective behind making panel decisions valid law
at the moment of inception was to eliminate delay and the lack
of compliance. 28 4 The beef and banana disputes, however,
demonstrate that even without the ability to block panel
decisions, the losing party can create lengthy delays and avoid
compliance. Indeed, without the ability to block an adverse
ruling, long delays and non-compliance may actually become
more viable alternatives. While on the one hand the new
binding nature of the DSU serves to bring more negotiated
settlements and fewer panels, it may also result in greater noncompliance from losing parties.
Concerns about the appellate process may also produce
greater non-compliance. One of the reasons for the creation of
the appellate process was to alleviate the effects of the
automatic adoption of panel rulings. 28 5 While a majority of
280. See Khansari, supra note 3.
281. See id.
282. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
283. See International Staff, U.S. Beef, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at 27.
Indicating that if the EU appeal fails in the beef hormone dispute, the European
Union would have three options: "to lift the ban on hormone-treated beef; to
maintain restrictions and compensate the United States for lost trade ... ; or to
ignore the ruling, which has been urged by France." Id.
284. See Khansari, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
285. See Konstantin J. Joergens, True Appellate Procedureor Only a Two-Stage
Process? A View of the Appellate Body Under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding,30 LAW & POLY INT'L BUs. 193, 195 (1999).
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experts express positive opinions of the Appellate Body's
functioning in the first three years, 28 6 some new concerns have
arisen. Critics have pointed to two major concerns: (1)
vagueness and lack of specificity within the ruling;28 7 and (2)
inconsistency and contradictory reasoning. 288 Such problems

with the appellate process may undermine a party's faith in the
system. As such, non-compliance may be seen as a more enticing
solution.
B.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

Probably the most compelling factor leading to compliance
is the desire to see a functioning legal process in the area of

international trade. A leading WTO expert argues that the main
reason the GATT achieved any success at all was due to a
strong community consensus that every GATT member should have a
right to have its legal claims heard by an impartial third-party
decision-maker... Although compliance was not always forthcoming,
the pressure to comply was almost always there once the community
28 9
arrived at a consensus that the ruling was correct.

Obviously, compliance based on international pressures

brings into question some of the other factors already discussed.
International pressure to comply will not exist if a consensus

cannot be reached regarding the correctness of the ruling.
Similarly, a lack of faith in the appellate process may also
reduce international pressures to comply. Ultimately, however,

the international community will likely see the rule-based
regulatory system as advantageous. A leading WTO expert
suggests four advantages of such a system:
A rule-based system is the most resource-efficient way to resolve
conflicts with other countries. A rule-based system is also the most
effective way to negotiate and capture desired policy changes in
achievable incremental steps. A rule-based system creates the most
predictable conditions for business decisions. Finally, a rule-based
system helps to cement one's own liberal trade policies against the
2 90
internal political pressures of protectionism.

286. See id. at 193.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 218-19. Jorgens points to United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, and India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products and two appellate decisions
containing such inconsistencies. See id.
289. Hudec, supra note 1, at 9.
290. Id.
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As such, increased faith in the rule-based regulatory system
will lead to international pressures for losing countries to
comply with WTO rulings.
C.

THE THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY

Since the creation of the WTO, member countries have
worried that it may pose a risk to sovereignty or the ability to
take necessary governmental actions on behalf of citizens. The
United States conducted hearings to determine the effect of the
WTO on United States sovereignty. 291 Several critiques of the
WTO resulted from sovereignty concerns. Critics argued against
the ability of unknown bureaucrats to determine that United
States laws violate international policy, and the United States'
ability to impose unilateral sanctions. 292 These sovereignty
concerns could be used in the future to justify non-compliance
293
with an adverse ruling.
Indeed, the beef hormone dispute has seen the
apprehension regarding sovereignty come to fruition. The
European Union has, and continues to claim, that the WTO
ruling infringes upon its right to determine the level of
protection it deems appropriate for its own citizens.2 94 Because
the European Union disagreed with the WTO decision, it chose
an implementation course than led to further delays and non295
compliance.
If countries continue to see the WTO as infringing upon
their sovereignty and do not see a viable means of settling the
dispute, non-compliance may become an acceptable option. This
presents a situation in which member nations simply choose
between compliance and sanctions. Where sanctions represent
the ultimate end of a given dispute, the WTO has failed in its
attempt to achieve compliance and help settle disputes. Indeed,
if superpower nations continue to choose sanctions over
compliance, the WTO serves little purpose in the arena of
dispute resolution. The disputes regarding beef and bananas
demonstrate the WTO's failure to achieve compliance from
superpower nations.
291. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 9.
292. See Schaefer, supra note 52, at 333-36.
293. This can also be attributed to the inability to block panel rulings. In a
situation in which the losing party feels that its sovereignty has been infringed
upon, its only real option may be non-compliance.
294. See Buckley, supra note 226 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
One of the main reasons for the creation of the WTO and its
new dispute settlement process was to eliminate much of the
delay and subsequent lack of compliance associated with
GATT's dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO institutes a
dispute resolution mechanism more rule-oriented than its
predecessor. It also prevents parties to a dispute from blocking
panel rulings. At the same time, the current disputes between
the United States and the European Union regarding bananas
and beef hormones demonstrate the WTO's inability to achieve
compliance from superpower nations. Each case has seen
lengthy delays, disagreements as to the interpretation of WTO
rulings, and ultimately, non-compliance from the losing party.
The banana and beef hormone disputes reveal that the WTO,
like its GATT counterpart, is ineffective at preventing both
delay and non-compliance. Without an ability to effectively
settle disputes, especially those between superpower nations,
the WTO serves little purpose in the dispute settlement arena.

